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The shifted pseudoisotropic multivariate distributions are shown to satisfy Ross’ stochastic dominance criterion for two-fund
monetary separation in the case with risk-free investment opportunity and furthermore to admit the Capital Asset Pricing Model
under an embedding in L𝛼 condition if 1 < 𝛼 ≤ 2, with the betas given in an explicit form. For the 𝛼-symmetric subclass, themarket
without risk-free investment opportunity admits 2𝑑-fund separation if 𝛼 = 1+1/(2𝑑−1), 𝑑 ∈ N, generalizing the classical elliptical
case 𝑑 = 1, and we also give the precise number of funds needed, from which it follows that we cannot, except degenerate cases,
have a CAPM without risk-free opportunity. For the symmetric stable subclass, the index of stability is only of secondary interest,
and several common restrictions in terms of that index can be weakened by replacing it by the (no smaller) indices of symmetry/of
embedding. Finally, dynamic models with intermediate consumption inherit the separation properties of the static models.
1. Introduction
Portfolio separation, that is, the property of reducing the
dimension of a portfolio optimization problem to a low
number of vectors (“funds”) without welfare loss to the
agents in question, has been treated extensively since Tobin
[1]. There are two main directions: the one which is the
subject of this paper is the characterization of those returns
probability distributions for which those funds will do for all
agents.The other is the characterization of preferences which
admit the property for all suitable returns distributions (the
standard work being Cass and Stiglitz [2], but see even the
modern probabilistic approach of Schachermayer et al. [3]);
there are also other routes to the separation property, for
example, risk measures, falling somewhat in between beliefs
and preferences (contributions include this author [4] and
independently Giorgi et al. [5]).
This paper concerns the distributional side of the theory,
where the standard literature reference is Ross [6]. Ross con-
siders preferences compatible with second-order stochastic
dominance (and in footnotes, preferences merely assumed
compatible with first-order dominance).The core of his result
is the property that the returns distribution vector be such that
the portfolio returns distributions (univariate) can be ordered
by their mean once a single dispersion parameter is given,
and for the second-order case: by their dispersion once the
mean is given. Subsequently, Owen and Rabinovitch [7] and
Chamberlain [8] establish that the elliptical (also frequently
referred to as “elliptically contoured”) distributions satisfy
Ross’ conditions for two-fund separation. Their setting is a
mean-variance tradeoff, tying the knot back to theMarkowitz
[9] approach as employed by Tobin [1]. Over these decades,
the development has offered surprises to quite a few of the
giants who bear today’s theory on their shoulders: Markowitz
turned out predated by more than a decade by de Finetti
[10] (see Markowitz’ account [11] where he also credits Roy
[12]). Tobin conjectured that any two-parameter portfolio
returns distribution familywould admit two-fund separation;
counterexamples were given by Samuelson [13], Borch [14],
and Feldstein [15]. Fama’s discovery ([16], can also be read
out of Samuelson [17]) that vectors of iid symmetric 𝛼-stables
admitted two-fund separation led Cass and Stiglitz to suggest
that 𝛼-stability was even necessary, making a reservation
for independence, which quickly turned out to be a most
appropriate one, asAgnew [18] provided a nonstable example.
However, the properties that enabledOwen, Rabinovitch, and
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Chamberlain to verify the Ross [6] criterion for the ellipticals
were to be found as far back as Schoenberg [19, 20] in 1938,
before modern portfolio theory.
The classical (elliptical) 2-fund separation result holds
irrespective of whether a “risk-free” nume´raire opportunity
exists, and one of the funds can be chosen to be the
safest available (the “minimum variance” portfolio, so the
risk-free case admits so-called “monetary separation”). This
paper considers the generalization to the (shifted) so-called
pseudoisotropic distributions, a multivariate class of symmet-
ric random variables such that all linear combinations of
the coordinates are of the same type. The pseudoisotropic
distributions admit a dispersion quasinorm 𝜍 (often called the
“standard”) which is symmetric and positively homogeneous
and which, together with the excess returns entering via a
location shift, characterizes the portfolio return distribution
completely, which is briefly summarized as follows:
(i) With risk-free opportunity, the (shifted) pseudo-
isotropic distributions admit two-fundmonetary sep-
aration just like the elliptical subclass, or like the
subclass of iid symmetric 𝛼-stable random variables
as established already by Fama [16] (for results in
continuous time: this author [21] and Ortobelli et al.
[22]).
Furthermore, we have a CAPM if 𝜍 is differentiable
outside the origin; a fortiori, so is the case for the so-
called 𝛼-symmetric distributions with 𝛼 > 1, and for
the symmetric stables with index of stability > 1, but
also for certain nonintegrables.
(ii) Without risk-free opportunity, separation will only be
admitted by a few special cases leading to 2𝑑-fund
separation if the index of symmetry is one of the
values 𝛼 = 1 + 1/(2𝑑 − 1), 𝑑 ∈ N, that is, one-
and-an-oddth, where 𝑑 = 1 subsumes the elliptical
distributions 𝛼 = 2 = 1 + 1/1.
Also the CAPM breaks down except in elliptical or
degenerate cases. Fama [23, section VI.B] remarks
that the presence of risk-free opportunity “greatly
simplifies determination of the efficient set of port-
folios,” and indeed, for the 2𝑑-fund separation cases
just mentioned, the efficient set is no longer convex.
The paper will first introduce terminology and then in
Section 3 state the single-period market model and review
stochastic dominance. Section 4 will introduce pseudoiso-
tropic random variables, and Sections 5–7will point out how/
when they admit, respectively, monetary separation, sepa-
ration without risk-free opportunity, and CAPM. Section 8
sketches how a dynamic model inherits the separation prop-
erties from the static model.
2. Notation, Terminology, and
Standing Assumptions
Wework inR𝐷 for arbitrary finite𝐷 ≥ 2; some results will be
vacuous for low 𝐷. Random quantities are denoted by Latin
letters (boldfaced if vector-valued). Minuscles (Greek/Latin,
vectors if bold) are either nonrandom or choice variables;
a 𝐷-vector 𝜉 is called a portfolio if it takes values in a
given set to be denoted by 𝐻 or 𝐿 (notation to depend
on shape; “unrestricted” if no such set restriction is given).
1 is the vector of ones, and 0 is the null vector. Vectors
are columns by default, unless indicated by superscript “⊤”
(transposition) or given as a gradient. We apply the signed
power notation 𝑥⟨𝑝⟩ fl |𝑥|𝑝 sign(𝑥) even to vectors, element-
wise: x⟨𝑝⟩ = (𝑥⟨𝑝⟩
1
, . . . , 𝑥
⟨𝑝⟩
𝐷
)
⊤. (Notice that x 󳨃→ x⟨𝑝⟩ is
invertible.) Matrices are Greek uppercase boldfaced letters.
A set𝐻 ⫌ {0} is radial if it is composed as a union of half-
lines from the origin: x ∈ 𝐻 ⇔ 𝑞x ∈ 𝐻 ∀𝑞 > 0. Constraining
the portfolio to the closed first orthant models a “no short
sale” constraint, and we will use that terminology as well. No
short sale on some, but not all, investment opportunities will
also correspond to a radial constraint. As commonplace in
the literature, we will frequently refer to the nume´raire as the
“risk-free” investment opportunity and the other investments
as “risky.”
The ∼ symbol denotes equal probability law. A random
variable and its distribution are symmetric if X ∼ −X; then
𝜇 + X is called shifted symmetric for nonrandom 𝜇.
Assumption 1. We will allow for constraints to be specified
(in the single-period model, we will consider either the con-
straint to a radial set, covering, e.g., no short sale conditions,
to an affine half-space representing no borrowing or limited
degree of leverage, or to the affine hyperplane of no risk-
free opportunity). After having restricted the opportunity set
according to these constraints, we will assume the market
to be free from arbitrage opportunities and from redundant
investment opportunities. (If there is a redundant opportunity,
then we can leave it out and rebuild the model without it.) In
particular, the independent radial scalings𝑅
0
and𝑅 are never
Dirac at zero; if any of these is constant, it is without loss of
generality = 1.
Note that, in line with the literature on portfolio separa-
tion, we do not assume limited liability, which in fact holds
only in a few well-known cases, all elliptical.
3. The Single-Period Market and
the Preferences
Consider a single-period investment allocating wealth 𝑤
between 𝜉 in 𝐷 ∈ N “risky” investment opportunities and
the remaining 𝑤 − 1⊤𝜉 in a nume´raire (enumerated as the
0th coordinate) that returns 𝑋
0
per monetary unit invested.
Writing the risky returns vector as𝑋
0
1 + 𝜇𝑅
0
+X𝑅 for some
nonrandom location parameter 𝜇 (resembling a representa-
tion common for elliptical distributions, e.g., Cambanis et al.
[24]), the portfolio return then becomes our model ansatz
𝑤𝑋
0
+ 𝜉
⊤
(𝜇𝑅
0
+ X𝑅) . (1)
(𝑅
0
, 𝑅,X) will be specified conditional on 𝑋
0
, with (𝑅
0
, 𝑅)
conditionally independent of X. We will later assume X to
be symmetric (but not that it is integrable!). It will represent
no loss of generality to interpret, or even formally assume,
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𝑋
0
as “risk-free”; we say that a risk-free opportunity exists
unless all agents are constrained to 1⊤𝜉 = 𝑤.
We first define agents and then separation (to hold over
all agents); note that “𝑘-fund separation” implies 𝑘 + 1-fund
separation; Theorem 11 will specify when a result cannot be
improved upon.
Definition 2. To compare 𝑋∗ and 𝑋, suppose 𝑋 ≥ 0 a.s. and
consider the formula
𝑋
∗
+ ?̆? ∼ 𝑋 + 𝑋. (2)
(i) By an agentwemean a pair of initialwealth𝑤 ∈ R and
a partial preference ordering over random variables,
where preferences are such that𝑋∗ is always (weakly)
preferred to𝑋 whenever (2) holds with ?̆? = 0 a.s. for
some𝑋 ≥ 0 a.s., inwhich casewe say that𝑋∗ (weakly)
first-order stochastically dominates 𝑋.
(ii) An agent is risk-averse if 𝑋∗ is always (weakly)
preferred to𝑋 even whenever we admit any ?̆? which
is independent of the three others and symmetric.
(iii) Suppose that there exist 𝑘 ≥ 1 vectors (“funds”)
𝜑
1
, . . . ,𝜑
𝑘
such that, for any given portfolio 𝜉, there
exist 𝑞
1
, . . . , 𝑞
𝑘
so that return (1) is weakly first-order
stochastically dominated by the return obtained using
in place of 𝜉 in (1) the portfolio
𝜉
∗
= 𝑞
1
𝜑
1
+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + 𝑞
𝑘
𝜑
𝑘
. (3)
Thenwe say that the returns distribution admits 𝑘+1-
fund monetary separation if a risk-free opportunity
exists (fund 𝑘 + 1 being the nume´raire) and 𝑘-fund
separation if nume´raire holdings 𝑤 − 1⊤𝜉∗ vanish
identically for all agents.
Remark 3. Notice first that we do not assume that each agent
has an “optimal” (finite) portfolio; rather, the property says
that for any given portfolio there is one which is at least
as good and which uses only the funds (implying that the
restriction to the funds is without welfare loss).
Item (i) is the so-called mass-transfer criterion for first-
order stochastic dominance. It is equivalent to either of the
following; see, for example, Østerdal [25] for more on the
various definitions: CDF
𝑋
∗ ≤ CDF
𝑋
, or E[𝑢(𝑋∗)] ≥ E[𝑢(𝑋)]
for every bounded nondecreasing (i.e., “utility”) function 𝑢.
Wewill frequently use that if neither𝑋∗ first-order dominates
𝑋 nor vice versa, then there are two agents which disagree
over preference between them; indeed, the utility function
1
𝑥≥𝑥
prefers 𝑋∗ to 𝑋 iff CDF
𝑋
∗(𝑥) ≤ CDF
𝑋
(𝑥). Notice that
there is no first-order dominance between 𝑋 and 𝜇 + 𝜎𝑋 if
𝑋 is real and symmetric and has full support and 𝜎 > 1 and
𝜇 ≥ 0; if one can increase 𝜎 without decreasing 𝜇, then there
is some agent who will prefer it and some who will not.
Second-order stochastic dominance corresponds to risk
aversion, but in contrast to the common literature, which
assumes sufficient integrability for E?̆? = 0 and 𝑢 concave, we
merely ask if an agent will reject any independent symmetric
noise. Risk aversion is not a main point of this paper and will
be invoked only in a few instances, where they can do with
fewer funds: As is well-known, all risk-averse agents can do
with the fund 1 if there is no risk-free opportunity and, for
example, all returns are iid Gaussian, but a non-risk-averse
agent could need another fund to boost variance.Theorem 11
will touch this issue.
Taking the well-known Gaussian as example, monetary
two-fund separation is due to the following features, assum-
ing for simplicity 𝑋
0
= 0: the set of all possible portfolio
returns is a family wherein each distribution is fully charac-
terized by location (which is a good to every agent!) and scale.
Both these functionals are homogeneous of degree one, so
if 𝜑 maximizes location given scale (standard deviation) of
1, then 𝑄𝜑 maximizes location given a scale of 𝑄, and for
every 𝜉 the return is first-order stochastically dominated by
𝑄𝜑 for the appropriate𝑄. The next section will introduce the
more general class of pseudoisotropic distributions which,
when shifted by a location, share these features.What will not
carry over, except in amuchweaker result valid in exceptional
cases, is separation under restriction to an affine subspace not
containing 0.
4. Pseudoisotropic and
𝛼-Symmetric Distributions
The pseudoisotropic random vectors form a multivariate
distribution class which contains, among others, the symmet-
ric ellipticals (and no other square-integrable distributions!)
and symmetric 𝛼-stables. The following will give a primer
on the theory assuming the basics of these subclasses are
known (see, e.g., Cambanis et al. [24] and the beginning of
Samorodnitsky and Taqqu [26]). For the idea of finding 𝐷-
dimensional versions of univariate distributions, see Eaton
[27]; the term pseudoisotropic does refer to the multivariate
X; see Jasiulis and Misiewicz [28, Definition 3].
Definition 4. A symmetric distribution in R𝐷 is called
pseudoisotropic if, for some order 1 positive-homogeneous
standard 𝜍 : R𝐷 → [0,∞) and some (complex) function
ℎ, the characteristic function can be represented as 𝑞𝜃 󳨃→
E[𝑒𝑖𝑞𝜃
⊤X
] = ℎ(|𝑞|𝜍(𝜃)).
Thus we have 𝜃⊤X ∼ 𝜍(𝜃)𝑋 for some marginal 𝑋
(any non-Dirac marginal 𝑋
𝑖
will do!), a property obviously
preserved under matrix transformations. Pseudoisotropy
generalizes ellipticity located at zero (then, 𝜍2 is a quadratic
form), but ellipticity admits some special properties. For
example, nonelliptical pseudoisotropic distributions cannot
have finite second-order moments and must be absolutely
continuous with respect to𝐷-dimensional Lebesguemeasure
except a possible point mass at the origin, or a marginal
being Dirac. Those exceptions can be done away with the
latter by the assumption of no arbitrage or no second risk-free
opportunity and the former by incorporating it in 𝑅. There is
thus no loss of generality in the following restriction to what
Misiewicz [29, Remark II.2.1] calls “pure” pseudoisotropic
measures.
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Assumption 5. For the pseudoisotropic distributions consid-
ered in this paper, no coordinate has any point mass at the
origin, and 𝜍(𝜃) = 0 only iff 𝜃 = 0.
Pseudoisotropy also generalizes symmetric 𝛼-stability;
indeed, if any two coordinates of a pseudoisotropic variable
are independent, we do have symmetric stability. Like for
symmetric stable distributions, there are some geometric
properties to observe. We introduce some terminology, com-
pare, for example, Koldobsky [30, 31] (wherein the reader also
can find why the restriction to 𝑝 ≤ 2 does not rule out any
interesting cases for our purposes) and Kalton et al. [32].
Definition 6. An origin-symmetric star body 𝐾 in R𝐷 is
an origin-symmetric compact with a continuous boundary
crossed precisely twice by each line through 0, required
interior to𝐾. Let the𝐾-quasinorm ‖⋅‖
𝐾
be the (well-defined!)
associated Minkowski functional ‖𝜃‖
𝐾
= min{𝑎 > 0; 𝜃/𝑎 ∈
𝐾}. Fix 𝑝 ∈ [0, 2]; we say that the quasinormed space
(R𝐷, ‖ ⋅ ‖
𝐾
) embeds in L𝑝 if ‖ ⋅ ‖
𝐾
admits a so-called Blaschke-
Le´vy representation
‖𝜃‖
𝐾
=
{{{
{{{
{
(∫
󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
𝜃
⊤x󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨
𝑝
𝜘 (𝑑x))
1/𝑝
, 𝑝 ∈ (0, 2] ,
exp∫ ln 󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨𝐴𝜃
⊤x󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨󵄨 𝜘 (𝑑x) , 𝑝 = 0
(4)
for some finite spectral measure 𝜘 supported by the unit
sphere (necessarily symmetric, and for 𝑝 = 0 it integrates to
one) and for 𝑝 = 0 some𝐴 > 0 (explicitly computed in terms
of 𝜘 in [32, p. 3-4]).The supremum over those 𝑝 ∈ [0, 2] such
that (4) holds seems not to have an established term: we call
it the embedding index.
Notice that if 𝑝 > 1, then ‖𝜃‖
𝐾
is strictly quasiconvex,
with (by bounded convergence) gradient = ∫(𝜃⊤x)⟨𝑝−1⟩x⊤𝑑𝜘
continuous for 𝜃 ̸= 0.
The connection to pseudoisotropic variables is the fol-
lowing fact, conjectured by Lisitski˘ı [33] and later proven by
Koldobsky [31, Corollorary 1], that for our purposes we do
have embedding in L0 (and thus the embedding index is a
well-defined number ∈ [0, 2]).
Theorem 7. For any pseudoisotropic X in R𝐷, 𝜍 is the
Minkowski functional ‖⋅‖
𝐾
of some origin-symmetric star body
𝐾, such that (R𝐷, ‖ ⋅ ‖
𝐾
) embeds in L0.
Embedding in L𝑝 for 𝑝 ∈ (0, 2] implies embedding in
L𝛼 for all 𝛼 ∈ [0, 𝑝], each with its own spectral measure,
henceforth the 𝛼-spectral measure if needed to distinguish; a
stronger assertion thanTheorem 7 is therefore the Misiewicz
conjecture that the embedding index is > 0. This question
remains open, though potential counterexamplesmust satisfy
restrictive conditions (see [30]). In particular, they must be
extremely tail-heavy, as it is well-known that nonembeddabil-
ity in L𝑝 (𝑝 ∈ (0, 2]) implies infinite 𝑝th-order moment.
The elliptical distributions located at the origin are pre-
cisely the ones which are pseudoisotropic and embed in L2.
The Blaschke-Le´vy representation (4) then takes the form
(𝜃
⊤
∫ xx⊤𝑑𝜘 𝜃)1/2. This exhibits a very special feature of the
ellipticals; namely, thatmatrix transformation (alongwith the
radial 𝑅) suffices to characterize dependence. Further prop-
erties unique to the ellipticals are that the 2-spectral measure
need not be unique (for 𝛼 < 2, however, all the 𝛼-spectral
measures of a spherical distribution must be uniform on the
unit sphere); furthermore, only for the ellipticals we have that
the probabilitymeasure exhibits the same elliptical symmetry
(affinely transformed isotropy) as the characteristic function;
and as mentioned, only for the elliptical class there are
distributions integrable at the order of the embedding index.
A special subclass of the pseudoisotropy, generalizing
the sphericals, is the so-called 𝛼-symmetric distributions,
introduced by Cambanis et al. [24], which exist for 𝛼 ∈ (0, 2].
Definition 8. A pseudoisotropic Z is called 𝛼-symmetric or
standard 𝛼-symmetric if one can take 𝜍 as the standard 𝛼-
norm ‖𝜃‖
𝛼
= (∑
𝑖
|𝜃
𝑖
|
𝛼
)
1/𝛼 (by slight abuse of notation). one
then callsX = ΣZ transformed𝛼-symmetric, orΣ-transformed
𝛼-symmetric. one calls 𝛼 (coinciding with the embedding
index!) the index of symmetry.
Thus a transformed 𝛼-symmetric has 𝛼-spectral measure
supported by only 2𝐷 unit vectors ±x(1), . . . , ±x(𝐷) which
span R𝐷; for the standard 𝛼-symmetrics, we have x(𝑖) = e
𝑖
.
Apart from the ellipticals, the arguably best known
examples are the vectors of iid symmetric 𝛼-stables. Such a
distribution has, if normalized to unit scale, characteristic
function exp(−‖𝜃‖𝛼
𝛼
). More generally, it is known since Paul
Le´vy that there exist 𝛼-symmetric 𝛼-stable distributions iff
2 ≥ 𝛼 ≥ 𝛼 > 0 (with characteristic function form exp(−‖𝜃‖𝛼
𝛼
);
such one can be generated by scaling an𝛼-symmetric𝛼-stable
X by an independent radial 𝑅 such that 𝑅𝛼 is 𝛼-stable). The
reader should beware the confusion in the literature, where
the notion of symmetry most often in the modern literature
means antipodal symmetry (as in this paper), although it is
used by other authors in the past for rotational invariance
(isotropy, implying ellipticity). This translates to a confusion
as to whether the canonical choice for a multidimensional
version of a symmetric𝛼-stable is the onewith iid coordinates
(𝛼-symmetric), or the elliptical one (chf = exp(−(𝜃⊤𝜃)𝛼/2)),
for example, in Owen and Rabinovitch [7, footnote 4].
Generally, when it comes to stable laws, the reader should
be warned against the literature’s inconsistent language and
notation, dubbed by Hall [34] as a “comedy of errors.”
For some 𝛼-symmetric distributions not generated from
stables, see Gneiting [35].
5. Portfolio Separation with Risk-Free
Investment Opportunity
The symmetry and positive homogeneity of the 𝜍 functional
immediately yield two-fund monetary separation for the
pseudoisotropics, in much the same way as the elliptical case
or the case of linearly transformed iid 𝛼-stable components
treated already by Fama [16]. It is already known that the
independence of (linearly transformed) coordinates is not
essential, for example, [36–38]. For 𝛼 ≤ 1, the L𝛼 unit ball is
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not only a nonconvex set; indeed, its complement intersected
with any orthant is a convex set (the first-orthant part of the
epigraph defining any component as a convex function of the
others).Thismotivates the nondiversification final part of the
following result.
Theorem 9. Consider market (1) with the restriction that the
portfolios are restricted to some closed radial set 𝐻 (possibly
= the entire R𝐷). Suppose that conditionally on 𝑋
0
, X is
pseudoisotropic with standard 𝜍.
Then there is two-fund monetary separation: for any given
𝜉, the return is first-order stochastically dominated by the
return using portfolio 𝜉∗ = 𝜍(𝜉)𝜑, where 𝜑 solves
max
𝜉∈𝐻
𝜉
⊤
𝜇
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝜍 (𝜉) = 1.
(5)
Suppose in the following that 𝐻 is a convex set such that
𝜉
⊤
𝜇 ̸= 0 for some 𝜉 ∈ 𝐻. Then 𝜑 is unique if the 𝜍-unit ball
is a strictly convex set, in particular if the embedding index is
> 1. On the other hand, if there is an extremum on an axis then
it is optimal to only invest in one opportunity, either a positive
position in the one with highest excess return/dispersion ratio,
or shorting the one with the largest negative such; this in
particular occurs with 𝛼-symmetric distributions when 𝛼 ≤
1. Under the additional assumption of iid coordinates and
𝐻 = R𝐷, holding only one risky opportunity implies either 𝛼-
symmetric 𝛼-stability or that all but one 𝜇
𝑖
vanish.
Proof. 𝐾 has continuous boundary, so𝜑 exists by the extreme
value theorem. Consider 𝜉 and 𝜉∗ = 𝜍(𝜉)𝜑. We have
𝜉
∗⊤X ∼ 𝜉⊤X and thus (by independence and nonnegativity)
𝜉
∗⊤
(𝜇𝑅
0
+ X𝑅) ∼ 𝜉⊤(𝜇𝑅
0
+ X𝑅) + (𝜉∗ − 𝜉)𝜇𝑅
0
, identifying
the latter a.s. nonnegative (since 𝑅
0
≥ 0) term as 𝑋 in (2).
Suppose 𝐻 is convex. If the embedding index is > 1 the
𝜍-unit sphere is smooth, yielding unique maximum unless
(contrary to assumption) 𝐻 is orthogonal to 𝜇. Otherwise,
we can have corner solutions; in particular for the standard𝛼-
quasinorms with 𝛼 ≤ 1, the convex hull of the unit ball is the
standard 1-norm, and pushing a plane as far as possible in one
direction while intersecting this leads to a corner. Finally, as
independent coordinates of a pseudoisotropic imply stability,
iid coordinates imply 𝛼-symmetric 𝛼-stability, which is a
well-known case.
A comment is appropriate. From a first course in finance,
one observes that agentswill diversify and that if we introduce
a new investment opportunity which offers return exceeding
the risk-free, onewill buy a positive amount of it as long as the
hedging benefit of shorting (fromapositive correlation) is not
too large. Of course, the argument is based on some degree
of integrability, and it is long known that nonintegrability
may lead to plunging all eggs into one basket (and from
the literature’s focus on the iid coordinate case, e.g., Fama
[16], this behaviour often shows up). It is generally not
straightforward to describe the dependence structure outside
L2 (nor excess return outside L1) but in the pseudoisotropic
case, the location 𝜇 and the 𝜍-ball will reveal what we need to
know. A sketch inR2 with 𝜇
2
> 𝜇
1
> 0with the “unit sphere”
being an ellipse around the origin will interpret analogues
of “correlation” and “hedging” graphically, but the geometric
arguments work for nonelliptical smooth 𝜍-unit spheres too;
if the 𝜍-sphere through (0, 1) does not fall too steeply there,
we must have adaptation in the first quadrant. However, if we
have a corner at (0, 1), the situation is different, in particular, if
𝜍 is the 1-norm |𝑥
1
|+|𝑥
2
|. But even for nonintegrable cases we
have differentiability if they admit embedding in L𝑝 for some
𝑝 > 1. Section 7 will utilize these arguments for the CAPM.
6. Some Special Results under
Constrained Leverage or No Risk-Free
Investment Opportunity
This section assumes transformed 𝛼-symmetry. By
Assumption 1, we can take the linear transformation Σ
of Definition 8 to be invertible even under constraint of type
(7) below; should the constraint remove an unrestricted
arbitrage, with Σ⊤𝜃 = 0 for some 0 ̸= 𝜃 ⊥ 𝜂, this risk-free
investment opportunity would violate Assumption 1.
Assumption 10. Throughout this section, X is Σ-transformed
𝛼-symmetric: X = ΣZ for some 𝛼-symmetric Z and some
invertible Σ. Introduce the notation
𝜁
⊤
= 𝜉
⊤
Σ,
^ = Σ−1𝜇,
𝜂 = Σ
−11
(6)
so that 𝜉⊤(𝜇 + X) = 𝜁⊤(^ + Z) and the total invested
risky amount becomes 𝜁⊤𝜂. The only portfolio constraints
considered in this section are the following leverage constraint
type, where 𝐿 = {𝑤}means no risk-free opportunity:
𝜁
⊤
𝜂 ∈ 𝐿 (possibly agent-dependent) . (7)
In particular we have no further restriction to arbitrary radial
𝐻.
The ellipticals admit 2-fund separation without risk-free
opportunity, and we will see that this generalizes, at the cost
of additional funds, to the special 𝛼-values 𝛼 = 1 + 1/odd.
Theorem 11. Consider the market under Assumption 10. Put
𝑑 =
1
2
⋅
𝛼
𝛼 − 1
(8)
and assume in parts (a)–(d) that 𝛼 ∈ (1, 2] (⇔ 𝑑 ≥ 1), while
in part (e) assume 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1].
(a) For 𝛼 ∈ (1, 2], the minimum-dispersion portfolio for no
risk-free opportunity, that is, the one which minimizes
the dispersion 𝜍 subject to the constraint, is 𝜉 = (Σ⊤)−1𝜁
with
𝜁 =
𝑤
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩𝜂
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩
2𝑑
2𝑑
𝜂
⟨2𝑑−1⟩
. (9)
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(b) Suppose 𝑑 ∈ N (i.e., 𝛼 = 1 + 1/𝑜𝑑𝑑). Then we have
2𝑑 + 1-fund monetary separation under constrained
leverage and 2𝑑-fund separation if there is no risk-
free investment opportunity. In both cases, the 2𝑑 risky
funds are (with the convention 00 = 1)
𝜑
𝑗
= (Σ
⊤
)
−1
(𝜂
𝑗−1
1
]2𝑑−𝑗
1
, . . . , 𝜂
𝑗−1
𝑛
]2𝑑−𝑗
𝑛
)
⊤
. (10)
Call a portfolio “efficient” if it is a linear combination
of these 𝜑
𝑗
and satisfies leverage constraint (7). When
𝑑 > 1 (i.e., 𝛼 ∈ {4/3, 6/5, 8/7, . . .}), the set of efficient
portfolios is not convex except in degenerate cases (this
in contrast with the case 𝛼 = 2 = 𝑑 + 1).
(c) Let the assumptions of part (b) hold, and consider the
number
?̃? fl min{2𝑑, 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙
𝜂
𝑖
]
𝑖
V𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑙𝑢𝑠 1 𝑖𝑓 ∃𝑖; 𝜂
𝚤
̸= 0 = ]
𝚤
} .
(11)
If there is no risk-free opportunity, then there are ?̃?
linearly independent funds such that all risk-averse
agents can choose optimally among them, while any
proper subset of these funds will fail to satisfy some risk-
averse agent.
If ?̃? > 1, still assuming no risk-free opportunity exists,
these funds also suffice for all agents, not necessarily
risk-averse. If ?̃? = 1, then all risk-averse agents will
choose minimum-dispersion portfolio (9) (recovering
the classical degeneracy of one-fund separation over
risk-averse agents), while other agents require an arbi-
trary (nonnull) free portfolio in addition.
Under constrained leverage, we havemin{3, ?̃?+1} fund
monetary separation; the above funds together with the
risk-free are sufficient to satisfy any agent.
(d) Part (b) does not generalize to the case where 𝑑−1/2 ∈
N (i.e., 𝛼 = 1 + 1/𝑒V𝑒𝑛); if we formally consider the
funds of (10) with an odd number for 2𝑑, there are cases
where some agent cannot be satisfied by these funds.
(e) Suppose in this part that 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1]. Then any agent
holds the zero position in all but at most two opportu-
nities (where in contrast to separation results, different
agents may require different pairs). The minimum-
dispersion portfolio for the equality constraint 𝜁⊤𝜂 = 𝑤
can be chosen on one axis (possibly nonunique). This
portfolio is chosen by all risk-averse agents in the special
case where ^ is proportional to 𝜂.
Before proceeding to the proof, notice that the case, where
(11) yields 1, is the only where an opportunity with 𝜂
𝑖
= ]
𝑖
= 0
is not redundant. Indeed, if Σ is the identity, then (11) counts
the number of different marginal distributions of nonzero
excess returns; then if there are at least two, one with zero
excess return (possibly desired by a non-risk-averse agent)
can be generated as a linar combination.
Proof. In order not to be first-order dominated, any agent
who chooses the level 𝑤 ∈ 𝐿 for 𝜁⊤𝜂 (where 𝑤 = 𝑤 is
mandatory if there is no risk-free opportunity) and the level
𝜍 for dispersion must choose a solution of the problem
max
𝜁
𝜁
⊤^
subject to ‖𝜁‖𝛼
𝛼
= 𝜍
𝛼
,
𝜁
⊤
𝜂 = 𝑤
(12)
with associated Lagrange condition to be used in what to
follow:
^ − 𝜆𝜂 = 𝛿𝛼𝜁⟨𝛼−1⟩ (13)
(mnemoniac: 𝜆 for the leverage constraint, 𝛿 for the disper-
sion constraint).
(a) For the minimum-dispersion portfolio, consider the
problem
min
𝜁
‖𝜁‖
𝛼
subject to 𝜁⊤𝜂 = 𝑤
(14)
and in case 𝛼 > 1 this is a concave problem with
solution uniquely given by (9) (which is a limiting
case of (13)).
(b) To cover the last part first, (13) has only two param-
eters, so the possibly optimal portfolios will, at least
piecewise, form at most 2-dimensional surface, not
convex unless subset of a plane, which, for the 2𝑑-
fund cases, 𝑑 > 1, requires the number of funds to
degenerate to at most 3.The possible degeneracies are
addressed in item (c).
Now for the separation result itself, odd signed pow-
ers are just ordinary powers, so (13) yields
𝜁
𝑖
⋅ (𝛿𝛼)
2𝑑−1
= (]
𝑖
− 𝜆𝜂
𝑖
)
2𝑑−1
. (15)
If 𝛿 ̸= 0, expand the power and collect terms to get the
2𝑑 risky funds given by (10), and in addition there is
the risk-free, unless it vanishes identically. To address
degeneracies, the constraint qualification could fail,
but only at the minimum-dispersion portfolio, which
is the fund 𝜑
2𝑑
. And the remaining case 𝛿 = 0 implies
^ = 𝜆𝜂, which is subsumed in the next item.
(c) Let us first cover the case when ^ and 𝜂 are propor-
tional. Then the left-hand side of (13) collapses to one
vector, a scaling of (9). In addition there is the risk-
free, if one such exists, but if it does not, then by
proportionality the excess return is uniquely given by
𝑤, so that 𝛿 = 0.
If 𝛿 = 0, there has to be an additional fund ⊥ 𝜂, at
zero price, but also not contributing to excess return,
to satisfy agents who want higher than minimum
dispersion. (Risk-averse agents will choose the zero
position in this fund.)
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To establish the number of funds needed, that is, the
number of linearly independent vectors in expansion
(10) (cf., (15)), assume 𝛿 ̸= 0 (otherwise we have the
proportionality just covered) and 𝜆 such that
(𝛿𝛼)
2𝑑−1
𝜁 =
2𝑑
∑
𝑗=1
(
2𝑑 − 1
𝑗 − 1
) (−𝜆)
𝑗−1
𝜑
𝑗
. (16)
We wish to pick 2𝑑 agents with distinct 𝜆 values.That
is possible (cf., Remark 3) as two distributions with
different dispersions are never ordered by first-order
dominance; dot each side of (13) with 𝜂 to eliminate 𝛿
and get, for 𝑤 > 0,
𝜁 =
𝑤
𝜂⊤ (^ − 𝜆𝜂)⟨2𝑑−1⟩
(^ − 𝜆𝜂)⟨2𝑑−1⟩ . (17)
Scaling the problem by 𝑤 by replacing 𝜍 by 𝑤𝜍, we
have a static maximization problem where different
choices of dispersion lead to different 𝜆’s.
Gather the 2𝑑 agents’ portfolios in a matrix Ξ. Then
we can write
𝛼
𝑘
ΞΔ = ΓΠΛ
⊤
, (18)
where Δ is the diagonal 2𝑑 × 2𝑑 invertible matrix
with the agents’ 𝛿 multipliers on the main diago-
nal, Π is the diagonal 2𝑑 × 2𝑑 invertible matrix
with the binomial coefficients ( 2𝑑−1
𝑗−1
) on the main
diagonal, Γ is the matrix of the funds (𝜑
1
, . . . ,𝜑
2𝑑
),
and Λ is the Vandermonde matrix of the (−𝜆)’s,
that is, with row 𝑗 being the geometric sequence
(1, −𝜆
𝑗
, (−𝜆
𝑗
)
2
, . . . , (−𝜆
𝑗
)
2𝑑−1
)
⊤, and invertible as the
𝜆’s are distinct.
It remains to find the rank of Γ, and it follows by
properties of Vandermonde determinants and their
minors. Pick ℓ ≤ 2𝑑 rows each with ]
𝑖
nonzero;
these rows are then ]2𝑑−1
𝑖
times a geometric sequence
(1, 𝜂
𝑖
/]
𝑖
, . . . , (𝜂
𝑖
/]
𝑖
)
2𝑑−1
), and we have full rank when-
ever these rows have 𝜂
𝑖
/]
𝑖
distinct but not if two such
ratios coincide. Let ℓ be the maximum number of
linearly independent ]
𝑖
̸= 0 rows, and form a matrix
of these rows and an arbitrary nonnull row of the
form (0, . . . , 0, 𝜂2𝑑
𝚤
) (equivalent to ]
𝚤
= 0 ̸= 𝜂
𝚤
), if
there is one. If such a nonnull row does exist and
ℓ < 2𝑑 (= the number of columns), it is another
linearly independent row.
The last statement follows as the unconstrained opti-
mum is spanned by (10), namely, the single fund 𝜑
1
.
(d) This part will implicitly use Remark 3 so that a
continuum of multiplier pairs will actually be chosen
by different agents. Observe that, in the even-power
case, (13) does not yield (15), but
𝜁
𝑖
= (
]
𝑖
− 𝜆𝜂
𝑖
𝛿𝛼
)
𝑘
sign(
]
𝑖
− 𝜆𝜂
𝑖
𝛿𝛼
) (19)
which does not expand to a polynomial. Suppose for a
counterexample that ]
𝑛
/𝜂
𝑛
> ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ > ]
1
/𝜂
1
> 0, with all
𝜂
𝑖
> 0. Let 𝜍 grow fromminimumdispersion (which is
of the form of expansion (10)). At the point where the
optimum falls outside the appropriate simplex (e.g.,
the unit simplex if 𝜂 = 1 and 𝑤 = 1), opportunity #1
is shorted, requiring one more fund.
(e) Finally, assume 𝛼 ∈ (0, 1]. Then the intersection of
each orthant with the exterior of the L𝛼 unit sphere is
convex. Except in the proportional case, and as long
as dimension exceeds 2, maximizing 𝜁⊤^ subject to
being in the plane 𝜁⊤𝜂 and on the L𝛼 (quasi-norm)
sphere is to move a line in parallel to this plane until
it no longer intersects the interior of the L𝛼 ball; then
some coordinate becomes zero. Remove that coordi-
nate from the model and repeat the argument until
there are only two left (in which case the constraints
form a discrete set and the process cannot be iterated).
Notice that the only way an agent can obtain disper-
sion as low as 𝑐(𝜁) = |𝑤|/max
𝑖
|𝜂
𝑖
| is to choose all
coordinates of 𝜁 as zero except for a (not necessarily
unique) 𝑖with highest |𝜂
𝑖
| (nonzero, as the Σmatrix is
assumed invertible), in which the position should be
𝑤/𝜂
𝑖
; note that in case of nonuniqueness, theminimum
dispersion is not attained by mixing two opportuni-
ties, except in the case 𝛼 = 1. This resolves the special
case. Obviously, a minimum-dispersion portfolio is
indispensable, as some agent would chooseminimum
dispersion. However, an agent choosing higher dis-
persion could very well choose two different opportu-
nities, as the minimum-dispersion portfolio may not
pay off very well in terms of ]
𝑖
(say, it could be zero).
Remark 12. In item (c) the first part asserts that all funds
are needed in order to satisfy all agents, even all risk-averse,
but the last sufficiency claim does not; although any level of
dispersion will be chosen by some agent, it is not necessary so
that any 𝑤 will be chosen. Assume, with no claim to realism,
that all ]
𝑖
< 0; then the opportunities will be shorted, and any
(positive) upper bound on 𝜁⊤𝜂 would be inactive.
Using the leverage constraint, we can extend the separa-
tion result to agent-specific leverage-dependent interest rates
as follows. Suppose that agent number 𝑎 has interest spread of
𝑟
𝑎
= 𝑟
𝑎
(𝜉
⊤1) = 𝑟
𝑎
(𝜁
⊤
𝜂) relative to the risk-free opportunity;
intuitively it makes sense that 𝑟
𝑎
has the same sign as 𝜁⊤𝜂−𝑤
(if it is interest paid).Then the agent’s excess return at leverage
𝑤 is not anymore 𝜁⊤^, but
𝜁
⊤^ − 𝑟
𝑎
𝜁
⊤
𝜂. (20)
The following property then easily carries over from the
classical case.
Corollary 13. Theorem 11 applies to the case of individual
leverage-dependent interest rate just as for constrained lever-
age. Also, it admits 𝐿 = 𝐿
𝑎
individual.
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Proof. For whatever choice of 𝜍, 𝑤 agent 𝑎 considers, the
−𝑟
𝑎
𝜁
⊤
𝜂 = −𝑟
𝑎
(𝑤)𝑤 term goes outside the maximization,
and the problem reduces to the problem for an agent with
wealth 𝑤 = 𝑤, choice 𝜍, and no risk-free opportunity, except
that agent 𝑎’s position in the risk-free opportunity does not
vanish.
7. When Do We Have a Capital
Asset Pricing Model?
This section establishes a Capital Asset Pricing Model for the
pseudoisotropic distributions provided the embedding index
exceeds 1, and there is a risk-free opportunity. We will in this
case obtain some elements of the elliptical CAPM: there is
the Markowitz bullet (namely, a (strictly!) convex risk/return
set for the risky opportunities), a pricing characterization
formula in the form of risk free return plus beta times market
excess return times, and a securities market line where the
agents will adapt.
A CAPM can be deduced assuming tradeoff between
excess return (𝜉⊤𝜇, desired) and some dispersion functional,
and so there is nothing novel to the following derivation save
for the fact that (shifted) pseudoisotropy makes the location-
dispersion ansatz valid for all agents. Apart from that, the
argument mimics a textbook approach and we only sketch
it: starting from a position in a location-dispersion efficient
portfolio 𝜉∗ ̸= 0 (same for all agents, up to scaling) the agent
can then consider buying a (sufficiently small) portfolio 𝛿
and scale the risky portfolio 𝜉∗ by a factor 1 − 𝑏(𝛿)/𝜍(𝜉∗)
as to maintain the portfolio returns dispersion 𝜍(𝛿 + (1 −
𝑏(𝛿)/𝜍(𝜉
∗
))𝜉
∗
) fixed at level 𝜍(𝜉∗), this implicitly defining 𝑏.
Formal differentiation yields ∇𝑏(0) = ∇𝜍(𝜉∗) =: 𝛽⊤. By the
assumed efficiency, 𝛿 = 0 must maximize location given
dispersion, yielding the formal first-order condition 𝜇⊤ =
(𝜇⊤𝜉
∗
/𝜍(𝜉
∗
))∇𝑏(0). Without rigorously defining “CAPM,”
we give the following stylized fact.
Proposition 14 (location-dispersion CAPM). Suppose that
the excess returns are 𝜇 + X and a risk-free opportunity exists
and that each agent chooses portfolio (unrestricted) as to trade
off the value of 𝜉⊤𝜇 (of which more is preferred) against only
a dispersion measure 𝜍(𝜉) which is positive for 𝜉 ̸= 0 and
homogeneous of degree one and has a subdifferential 𝑆 at
the market portfolio 𝜉∗ (defined as the total risky investment
made in the economy, or, by homogeneity, an arbitrary positive
scaling).
Then we have a CAPM with excess returns satisfying 𝜇 =
(𝜉
∗⊤
𝜇/𝜍(𝜉
∗
))𝛽, for some 𝛽 ∈ 𝑆.
The hypothesis of this assertion is however a theorem
under the assumption of pseudoisotropy and embedding
index above 1; then 𝜍 is C1 outside 0, and each agent (by the
definition of “agent” in this paper) will choose a nondomi-
nated portfolio return, which by Theorem 9 is unique up to
scaling. We summarize the following.
Theorem 15 (pseudoisotropic CAPM when the embedding
index exceeds 1). Consider a market of agents trading a given
supply of risky opportunities with excess returns 𝜇+X and one
risk-free opportunity, whereX is pseudoisotropic with standard
𝜍 ∈ C1(R𝐷 \ {0}) (in particular: if the embedding index is > 1).
Then the hypothesis of Proposition 14 applies, with 𝑆 being
a singleton. IfX is furthermore Σ-transformed 𝛼-symmetric for
𝛼 > 1, then the betas are (uniquely) given as
𝛽 = Σ(
Σ⊤𝜉
∗
󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩Σ
⊤𝜉
∗󵄩󵄩󵄩󵄩𝛼
)
⟨𝛼−1⟩
. (21)
Observe that we cannot obtain the so-called zero-beta
CAPM where no risk-free opportunity exists, as we do
not have two-fund separation; we cannot then claim that a
market aggregate of (agents’ individual) efficient portfolios is
efficient.
Remark 16. CAPM versions valid for integrable symmetric
stable X are recovered as corollaries: first, the symmetric-
stable CAPMof Fama [23], who assumedΣ-transformed iid’s,
is precisely Theorem 15 with the additional assumption that
𝛼 > 1 is the index of stability and of symmetry.
Also we obtain and generalize even within the class of
symmetric-stables the CAPM of Belkacem et al. [37] and of
Gamrowski and Rachev [38]. Their approach employs the
covariation (see [26, Section 2.7]) which unlike covariance
is not symmetric: we speak of the covariation of a security’s
return on (not “and”!) the market portfolio’s return; dividing
this quantity by the dispersion as quantified by the standard
𝜍(⋅), we get a nonsymmetric “correlation coefficient” which
becomes the security’s beta. Indeed, formulating Theorem 15
in terms of the embedding index and the shape of 𝜍 extends
not only the CAPM of [37, 38] but also the covariation func-
tion itself both beyond symmetric stability and to many non-
integrable stable cases.The latter is not surprising though: the
result for an 𝛼-symmetric 𝛼-stable X and 𝑅𝛼 being 𝛼-stable
(𝛼 ≤ 1 ≤ 𝛼) should not change if we instead consider X󸀠𝑅󸀠
where 𝑅󸀠 ≡ 1 and X󸀠 fl X𝑅, which is 𝛼-symmetric 𝛼-stable.
8. Outline: Dynamic Models
Inheriting the Separation Properties of
the Static Model
The results generalize to dynamic models where the price
processes have the appropriately distributed increments. For
a motivating example, reconsider the single-period market
treated this far as a two-stage decision with preferences
over initial consumption, terminal consumption, and bequest
(= whatever remains), with an initial investment decision.
Should a dominance result like Theorem 9 apply, the agent
can improve a strategy that uses portfolio 𝜉 the same way:
keep initial consumption, replace 𝜉 by 𝜉∗ = 𝜍(𝜉)𝜑, and,
rather than keeping the excess wealth, increase terminal
consumption by (𝜉∗−𝜉)⊤𝜇𝑅
0
, leaving the bequest unchanged
in distribution. This should be preferable to an agent who
prefers more to less, and we will adapt the preference
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assumption to the dynamic setting by modifying the mass-
transfer criterion, for brevity omitting risk aversion in this
section.The approach is based on [21], which in turn is based
on an approach of Khanna and Kulldorff [39] which makes
a somewhat less rigorous (but very neat!) argument for a
geometric Brownian Black-Scholes-type model.
We take as given a sequence 𝑡
0
< 𝑡
1
< 𝑡
2
< ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , and a prob-
ability space (Ω,F, P) equipped with a filtration generated
by a sequence of independent Z(𝑡
𝑛
); F
0
is generated by
the null sets of F
0
and inductively F
𝑛
by F
𝑛−1
and Z(𝑡
𝑛
).
Fixing initial cumulative consumption to zero without loss of
generality and initial (but postconsumption!) wealth at given
arbitrary 𝑦
0
, we extend the mass-transfer concept of stochas-
tic dominance over the probability laws of consumption-
wealth process pairs (𝑌, 𝛾) as follows.
Definition 17. By an agent we mean a pair (𝑦
0
, ⪰) of wealth
𝑦
0
∈ R at time 𝑡
0
and a partial ordering ⪰ over adapted
process pairs such that (𝑌∗, 𝛾∗) is weakly preferred over (𝑌, 𝛾)
whenever there is a.s. nondecreasing adapted process 𝛾 with
𝛾(𝑡
0
) = 0 such that (𝑌∗, 𝛾∗) ∼ (𝑌, 𝛾 + 𝛾).
By a strategy we mean an adapted process pair
{(𝛾(𝑡
𝑛
), 𝜉(𝑡
𝑛
))}
𝑛=0,1,...
with 𝛾(𝑡
0
) = 0, where we assume 𝜉(𝑡
𝑛
) to
take values in a set of precisely one of the two following forms
(the choice of which is predetermined and nonrandom):
either a given closed radial set 𝐻
𝑛
(if a risk-free opportunity
exists) or to the set {𝜉(𝑡
𝑛
)
⊤1 = 𝑌(𝑡
𝑛
)} for each agent (if it does
not exist).
Remark that we do not want the agent to care about pre-
consumption wealth other than through consumption and
postconsumption wealth, andTheorem 18 will be formulated
accordingly, defining 𝑌(𝑡
𝑛+1
) net of the consumption at time
𝑡
𝑛+1
. Note also that as we only care about the law, that is, the
finite-distributional distributions, we need only to show sep-
aration for every natural number of periods. It would be nat-
ural to restrict the strategies further, for example, requiring
insolvent agents to close out their positions and stay on a fixed
consumption per period (note that agents will become insol-
vent in this model); however, as we only compare strategies
pairwise, we can show separation without any such admissi-
bility restriction, and then discard any nonadmissible strate-
gies, as long as the opportunity set only depends on past
through the agent’s history and is not restricted by increasing
consumption from 𝛾 to 𝛾∗.
As we have seen from the single-period model, the
independent radial scalings in (1) play no part in the result,
and neither does the distribution of the risk-free opportunity;
we do not lose any generality by normalizing the radials to the
constant 1 and the risk-free return to the constant 0.
We then have the dynamic model and the separation
theorem as follows, which in the interest of brevity is
formulated a bit loosely especially in part (b).
Theorem18. Suppose that eachZ(𝑡
𝑛+1
) is pseudoisotropicwith
(nonrandom) standard 𝜍
𝑛
. Assume given nonrandom𝜇(𝑡
𝑛
) and
Σ(𝑡
𝑛
), the latter satisfying for each agent and each strategy
𝜉(𝑡
𝑛
)
⊤
Σ(𝑡
𝑛
)Z(𝑡
𝑛+1
) = 0 only on the event {𝜉(𝑡
𝑛
) = 0} and
possibly a null set. Suppose that discounted wealth at time 𝑡
𝑚
,
𝑚 ∈ N, is given by
𝑌 (𝑡
𝑚
) = 𝑦
0
− 𝛾 (𝑡
𝑚
)
+
𝑚−1
∑
𝑛=0
𝜉 (𝑡
𝑛
)
⊤
[𝜇 (𝑡
𝑛
) + Σ (𝑡
𝑛
)Z (𝑡
𝑛+1
)] .
(22)
Assume that at time 𝑡
𝑛
the following hold with 𝜇(𝑡
𝑛
) for 𝜇
and X fl Σ(𝑡
𝑛
)Z(𝑡
𝑛+1
):
(a) If there is a risk-free opportunity, assume the hypothesis
ofTheorem 9 is satisfiedwith𝐻 fl the (radial) portfolio
restriction at time 𝑡
𝑛
. Then for every agent in the
dynamic market and each strategy (𝛾, 𝜉), there is one
strategy which at time 𝑡
𝑛
uses the portfolio 𝜍(𝜉(𝑡
𝑛
))𝜑,
and which leads to a preferred wealth-consumption
process.𝜑 (given inTheorem 9) is common to all agents.
(b) If there is no risk-free opportunity assume the hypothe-
sis of some part (a) to (e) ofTheorem 11 holds at time 𝑡
𝑛
.
Then analogously, the conclusion of the respective part
of Theorem 11 holds at time 𝑡
𝑛
(with the same funds, as
therein).
In words, this means that the dynamic model inherits,
time-by-time, the separation properties that the distribution
would infer in a single-period model.
A proof can easily be constructed from the proof of
the single-period model by following [21], which shows the
elliptical or stable case in the more complicated continuous
time model, based on Khanna and Kulldorff [39] for the
Gaussian case.The essence is that we can simply consume the
excess at each time, and the (strong) Markov property will
leave us with the same opportunity set for all future. To see
this, consider a single time 𝑡
𝑛
for which the hypothesis holds
true. Whatever portfolio 𝜉 the strategy yields, we can replace
it by some 𝜉∗ of the same scale 𝜍(𝜉∗) = 𝜍(𝜉) which uses the
fund. Imagine for the moment that we simply dispose of the
excess (𝜉∗ − 𝜉)⊤𝜇(𝑡
𝑛
) (≥ 0); then we have merely replaced
next period’s wealth and consumption by one of the same
(conditional) distribution, and thus the opportunity set, the
set of possible laws of {(𝑌∗, 𝛾∗)}
𝑡>𝑡
𝑛
(thus of {(𝑌∗, 𝛾∗)}
𝑡≥𝑡
0
),
is the same; by assumption this replacement is (weakly)
preferred by every agent. Now drop the fictitious disposal and
increase the consumption at time 𝑡
𝑛+1
by (𝜉∗ − 𝜉)⊤𝜇(𝑡
𝑛
). By
assumption, this increase is (weakly) preferred by every agent.
9. Concluding Remarks
It was natural to develop portfolio theory for shifted sym-
metric stable returns, from the defining property of stability,
as long as one did not realize that matrix multiplication was
not sufficient to capture the dependence structure. Indeed,
with preferences only over portfolio return, not of the returns
of the individual opportunities, the defining property of
pseudoisotropic distributions almost begs the question of
portfolio separation, and this paper has extended the classical
portfolio theory to those distributions. Doing so, we are able
to recast the theory for symmetric stables as well, in a way
10 Journal of Probability and Statistics
that not only is much less restrictive but shows that the
basic properties associated with symmetric stables are not the
crucial ones; the essential properties are in the geometry of
the standard 𝜍.
Within the class of pseudoisotropic distributions, the
possible diversification properties that follow from suitable
integrability are not integrability properties; they are geomet-
ric embeddability properties. For 𝛼-stables, the assumption
that 𝛼 > 1 is sufficient (but not necessary) that the index
of embedding is > 1, which again is sufficient that the 𝜍-
spheres are smooth, from which the qualitative properties
of the classical cases are recovered. Thus for the symmetric
stables, it is not the index of stability that is crucial.
The class of (transformed) 𝛼-symmetric distributions
highlights this: the 𝛼-symmetric stable distributions behave
in some sense, the same for given 𝛼, no matter which index
𝛼 of stability. Inspecting Fama’s characterization [16, formulae
(14)–(17)] we note that they hold true if wemerely replace his
assumption of 𝛼-stability by an assumption of 𝛼-symmetry.
This is well understood for the elliptical case (Owen and
Rabinovitch [7]), and we have established a direct extension,
under the assumption that a risk-free opportunity exists.
For the case without risk-free opportunity, the elliptical
distributions have unique properties, and it is directly con-
nected to the shape of the 𝜍-spheres. For the (transformed)
𝛼-symmetric distributions, the geometry enables us to make
a sequence of symmetry indices that admit weaker separation
results, namely, 𝑘-fund separation result for 1 + 1/(𝑘 −
1)-norm-symmetric variables when 𝑘 is even, generalizing
the elliptical case 𝑘 = 2. Thus within the class of 𝛼-
symmetric distributions (𝛼 > 1), separation now looks like an
exceptional property, one of a sequence inside a continuum,
although it is a generalization of a property of a family widely
considered an adequate approximation of reality (at least
implicitly, ellipticity is necessary for linearity of regression in
dimension > 2, Hardin Jr. [40]).
Althoughportfolio separation is a theoretical result which
has historically not concerned fit to real data, we make a
remark on applicability. Various heavy-tailed models have
been introduced to find a better fit to data, though one can
question whether a low order of integrability is in line with
the real world. However, the exact asymptotical tail index
is not necessarily the scope of application for a financial
model. Indeed, with the emergence of quantile measures (the
infamous value-at-risk), financial risk is often measured in a
way that totally disregards the order of integrability. Not only
does this make the objections less valid, one does not extract
from the model the properties that are most questionable,
but also the nonsubadditivity of value-at-risk may in certain
cases penalize diversification; behaviour according to this
does in fact require nonintegrability, and even that is not
sufficient: in the pseudoisotropic model this translates into
the 𝜍-sphere having corner (nondifferentiability points) and
an embedding index of at most one.
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